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UNIFYING COPYRIGHT: AN INSTRUMENTALIST’S 
RESPONSE TO SHYAMKRISHNA BALGANESH 
Richard A. Epstein∗ 
INTRODUCTION: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LAW 
It is altogether appropriate in a symposium devoted to the revival 
of private law that Professor Shyamkrishna Balganesh should write a 
paper to explain how the law of copyright is in fact moored deeply in 
the private law.1  In one sense, his claim sounds a bit like a paradox, 
for the origin of any copyright rests solely on the statutory system that 
confers on the holder of a copyright the exclusive right to use, license 
or sell any copyrighted work.2  All the requirements that are needed to 
generate a copyright — that it be, for example, an original work fixed 
in a tangible medium — derive from statute.3  In this regard, the law 
of copyright differs sharply from the law that governs land and chat-
tels, in which common law largely created the exclusive rights of use, 
and the limitations thereon, even if they are subject to statutory  
modification. 
The explanation as to why copyright falls under the rubric of pri-
vate law comes in two parts.  First, the definition of private law does 
not depend on the origin of the rights in question, but only on the par-
ties to a particular dispute.  Private law involves suits between two 
private individuals, neither of whom receives any privilege or ad-
vantage from the state.  In this regard, private law differs sharply 
from the two most common forms of public law.  The first involves 
situations in which the state imposes sanctions through the criminal 
law or in which it seeks to exercise the powers of taxation or eminent 
domain, which necessarily lodge only in public bodies or private indi-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 ∗ Laurence A. Tisch Professor of Law, New York University School of Law; Peter and 
Kirsten Bedford Senior Fellow, The Hoover Institution; James Parker Hall Distinguished Service 
Professor Emeritus of Law and Senior Lecturer, The University of Chicago.  My thanks to Samu-
el Eckman and Taylor Rouse, University of Chicago Law School, Class of 2013, for their valuable 
research assistance. 
 1 Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Obligatory Structure of Copyright Law: Unbundling the 
Wrong of Copying, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1664 (2012). 
 2 See Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as amended at 17 
U.S.C. §§ 101–810 (2006)). 
 3 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (“Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in original 
works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed, 
from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or 
with the aid of a machine or device.”). 
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viduals who are authorized to act on their behalf.  The second part of 
the explanation considers situations in which the state seeks to defend 
itself — for example, by some notion of sovereign immunity, which it 
claims provides it an absolute or qualified immunity against suit for 
any form of government misconduct.4 
This simple topology precludes creating as a structural matter any 
hard distinctions between the private law of land and the private law 
of copyright or, indeed, patents or any of the other forms of intellectual 
property.  The same rough equivalence holds with the public law as it 
relates to copyright and other forms of intellectual property.  These 
forms are subject to criminalization, taxation, condemnation, or even 
expropriation.  In all cases, the task at hand is to articulate a general 
analysis to resolve two problems.  The first is to explain the similarities 
and differences among the various fields.  The second is to explain 
how the various forms of property can be subsumed in a single general 
theory that respects these similarities and differences among the vari-
ous forms of property. 
In dealing with these issues, Balganesh is of two minds.  On occa-
sion, he speaks about the common elements between the various forms 
of property; other times, he stresses their differences.  But what is 
missing in his account is a unified theory of property that links the 
various strands together.  In this short response, I shall have time only 
to point out some of the gaps and the tension in Balganesh’s general 
approach.  In Part I, I examine whether property rights can be ad-
dressed solely in instrumental terms or whether some independent 
moral substrate lies beneath those admitted consequentialist virtues, 
and I conclude that there is no such independent basis.  In Part II, I 
ask whether it is possible to ignore the strict correlative nature of 
rights and duties in understanding how various systems of property 
rights work and conclude that it is not.  In Part III, I address the role 
of defeasibility in fleshing out any complete system of obligations un-
der the private law and again conclude that they operate in the same 
fashion in both domains.  Finally, in Part IV, I examine briefly the sys-
tematic interconnections between free speech and copyright law on the 
one hand and ordinary property rights and patents on the other.  I 
conclude that both copyright and patent law are justified deviations 
from a pure libertarian theory of property rights. 
I.  PROPERTY AS AN INSTRUMENTAL VIRTUE 
Balganesh is of two minds when he speaks about the instrumental 
virtue of copyright law.  The reasons to support it are clear — namely, 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 4 See, e.g., Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 
(1999); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996). 
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the view that the creation of exclusive rights in various kinds of writ-
ings promotes their long-term creation.  But he is uneasy about casting 
copyright law uniquely in such consequentialist terms.  Taking a cue 
from his Oxford mentor, the late Professor Peter Birks,5 Balganesh also 
thinks that it is important to take into account “a uniquely legal nor-
mativity that instrumental accounts find difficult to capture.”6  In so 
doing, he clearly relies heavily on Professor Ernest Weinrib’s influen-
tial effort to develop a system of private law that rests upon the notion 
of “correlativity,”7 which Weinrib contends is founded on “a bipolar 
conception of the remedy as the annulment of the parties’ correlative 
gain and loss.”8 
I confess that I find this overall approach an intellectual nonstarter.  
The first difficulty with it is common to all efforts that seek to unify 
two distinct approaches into a coherent whole.  That task cannot be 
done if each of the two notions is irreducible to the other.  At that 
point, we are in an “ordinal universe” in which the only cases with 
clear results are those in which the two tests point in the same direc-
tion — at which point we can accept either and ignore the other with-
out having to choose between them.  Yet whenever the two variables 
point in the opposite direction, there is no principled way to give one 
lexical preference over the other or to reduce the two to a common de-
nominator.  Balganesh claims an effort to spell out the architecture of 
copyright is more than just of theoretical significance but does not ex-
plain why or offer an example of any outstanding dispute in copyright 
law that is clarified by resort to this two-part procedure. 
A more uniform, consequentialist view of property law avoids these 
analytical traps.  That approach develops legal rules and legal institu-
tions — both are key — in a systematic fashion that maximizes a spe-
cific conception of human well-being.  That substantive view proceeds 
by comparing alternative legal regimes in order to see whether at least 
one person is better off in one regime when no person is worse off and 
then moves to that position.  This conscious effort to use legal rules to 
create Pareto improvements creates a unified theory because it com-
pares various costs in a systematic, incremental fashion.  It starts with 
any baseline and examines its properties.  Once the defect in those ar-
rangements is identified, it introduces a specific proposal for an overall 
improvement and examines whether the proposal achieves its intended 
result. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 5 See Peter Birks, Rights, Wrongs, and Remedies, 20 O.J.L.S. 1, 27 (2000); Peter Birks, The 
Concept of a Civil Wrong, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW 29, 37 (David G. 
Owen ed., 2005).   
 6 Balganesh, supra note 1, at 1664. 
 7 ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW 114–44 (1995). 
 8 Id. at 66. 
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It is just this theory that props up the general social contract theory 
that derives from Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, David Hume, and 
Adam Smith.  It starts with the state of nature and asks what incon-
veniences exist in a world without property.  Chaos and tumult supply 
a sufficient answer.  The recognition of personal rights of autonomy 
improves the overall situation markedly if all persons are secure 
against the use of force and fraud by others.  That result cannot be 
created by voluntary exchanges that bind all persons over all times, so 
they are imposed through a “social contract” whose terms are justified 
not by any form of individualized consent, but by the overall im-
provements that it creates for all persons who live under that regime.  
Next, these individuals may acquire property by occupation or cap-
ture, which again produces an overall improvement by generating se-
curity of possession for all persons.  These institutions are not self-
enforcing, so the state then taxes all individuals such that the revenues 
they pay to the state cost less than the increase in the security of their 
persons and possessions.  How to operate at each of these stages cre-
ates many midlevel questions — how does the first possessor demar-
cate his claim, for example — which give rise to additional questions.  
And this regime is subject to further qualifications — should the first 
possession rules be limited in operation if the creation of common pool 
problems leads to premature extinction of various species?  But in 
each specific case we can ask questions such as whether the increased 
administrative costs of government are justified by the gains in output 
that they create; and we can use, if possible, side payments (just com-
pensation) to deal with any imbalance that the shift in legal regime 
creates.  The full process requires considerable conceptual elaboration 
and attention to institutional detail.  But it does not run into the theo-
retical difficulties that plague any effort to posit two independent val-
ues that are not reducible to each. 
II.  RIGHTS AND THEIR CORRELATIVE DUTIES 
Balganesh’s desire to isolate some distinctive noninstrumental val-
ue leads to a second major confusion in his attitude toward rights and 
duties.  At some points, he takes the traditional, or Hohfeldian,9 notion 
that rights and duties are strictly correlative.10  But at other times, he 
writes as if there is some deep mistake in the common accounts of 
copyright law ignoring this element because “copyright law is rarely, if 
ever, conceptualized as a duty-imposing system.”11  He seeks to bolster 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 9 Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial 
Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 30–32 (1913). 
 10 Balganesh, supra note 1, at 1667. 
 11 Id. at 1665. 
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this position by an appeal to the writing of Professor Jeremy Waldron, 
who observed that it is often productive to start with legal duties be-
cause “legal duties are hard things for people to have — since they 
constrain conduct and in that sense limit freedom.”12  That argument 
can then be bolstered by the claim that the “internal” aspect of law, as 
H.L.A. Hart defines it, deals with the sense of obligation as well.13 
With respect, the point gets us very little.  Rights are attractive be-
cause they expand freedom.  There is no more reason to start with du-
ties because they hurt than with rights because they benefit.  Nor 
should we think that the internal aspect of law only applies to duties.  
It also emboldens individuals to assert their claims because they have 
been legitimated by the same method of norm internalization that is so 
critical for the acceptance of duties.  In all cases, the question is not 
where we start, but where we conclude.  The key question is whether, 
at a minimum, the creation of the new set of right-duty relationships 
creates more wealth (or utility) than the one it displaces, which means 
that no matter where the inquiry starts, the conscientious evaluation of 
the comparison is strictly needed to get matters right.  Yet Balganesh 
does not go back to the traditional conception, but takes a different 
path.  Although his discussion on the point is not entirely clear, he 
seems to think that “power conferring rules” give more play to conse-
quentialist considerations than do “obligatory rules,”14 without explain-
ing how both can be done simultaneously in a legal regime in which 
rights and duties are strictly correlative. 
On balance, therefore, Balganesh is on far firmer ground when he 
insists on the strict “correlativity”15 of rights and duties than when he 
strays from that basic conception in his effort to undermine the in-
strumental conception of property that he questions from his opening 
paragraph, which weakly admits that “this instrumental focus may 
have the beneficial effect of limiting copyright’s unending expan-
sion.”16  The respect for correlativity, however, does not depend on 
embracing any particular normative theory of property rights.  It rests 
on nothing more than the simple proposition that this strict correlativi-
ty is an inevitable consequence of scarcity.  Any ability to create rights 
without imposing correlative duties is the legal equivalent of a perpet-
ual motion machine.  But given scarcity, all rights claims will neces-
sarily create conflicts, such that the social task is to find that mixture 
of rights and duties that minimizes those conflicts in light of the con-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 12 Jeremy Waldron, From Authors to Copiers: Individual Rights and Social Values in Intellec-
tual Property, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 841, 844 (1993).   
 13 H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 89–91 (1961).   
 14 Balganesh, supra note 1, at 1671–73. 
 15 Id. at 2. 
 16 Id. at 1. 
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sequentialist framework outlined above.  The deontic approach to 
which Balganesh shows limited fealty never explains how the scope of 
copyright protection turns “on the connection between an author and 
his or her creative expression.”17  Balganesh then touts this Kantian 
argument: “[c]opying is morally wrong not because it operates as an 
infraction of an ownership or property interest, but because it directly 
interferes with an individual’s ability to perform a speech act (that is, 
expression) and communicate with the public as speaker.”18  But the 
point is surely incorrect.  Copyright does not protect the right of the 
speaker to perform any speech act.  I can read my novel aloud happily 
long after it loses copyright protection.  The issue is of course exclusiv-
ity, which cannot simply be achieved by the speaker, but by the law, 
which can stop others from speaking without the copyright holder’s 
permission.  Balganesh at one point is puzzled about the difference be-
tween a positive right that “actively enables” speech and the use of 
copyright that “disables” the right of speech in others.19  But there is 
no mystery here.  No one needs help from the law to talk.  It is needed 
to suppress the speech of others who are quite able to speak for them-
selves.  The fatal weakness of the supposed deontic approach is that it 
never addresses the question of why an author is able to prevent others 
from copying that work. 
In order to avoid the solipsism of the deontic approach, it is neces-
sary to think of rights in two distinct ways.  The first sets out the 
rights that all persons have vis-à-vis the rest of the world over their 
person and their property.  The second asks what should be done 
when one person invades the rights of another.  The first is a question 
of property.  The second is a question of torts. 
On the first point, the standard rules of property require each per-
son to abstain from the use of force and fraud against the person or 
property of strangers.  That system only works because its obligations 
are simple enough for ordinary people everywhere to understand with-
out some special system of notice: keep your hands to yourself, as it 
were.  This system is also scalable, such that its basic commitments 
remain constant regardless of the number or identity of people it gov-
erns.  Finally, that system is largely invariant in relation to social levels 
of wealth, lest the content of the rights constantly shift with the ebb 
and flow of economic fortune.20  For these purposes, moreover, it is not 
important that the people governed by this legal regime understand its 
instrumental foundations, so long as they know how to conform their 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 17 Id. at 1677. 
 18 Id. at 1679; see also Immanuel Kant, On the Wrongfulness of Unauthorized Publication of 
Books, in PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY 23, 30, 33 (Mary J. Gregor ed., 1996). 
 19 Balganesh, supra note 1, at 1670. 
 20 For further discussion, see RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, DESIGN FOR LIBERTY 74–76 (2011). 
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conduct to its basic rules.  For that reason it is useful in everyday life 
for the “rights based,” or deontological approach, to exert a strong 
hold.  Insisting on the moral basis for these commands increases the 
rate of compliance by ordinary people, which in turn allows the social 
system to flourish. 
The second question goes to what kinds of conduct count as inva-
sions of that right.  Here, the instrumental and the deontic approaches 
surely coalesce so that virtually everyone, regardless of philosophical 
preference, agrees that this duty of uniform noninterference in the 
sense specified applies to deliberate use or threat of force.  The great 
fruits of this rule are found in the harms that never occur precisely be-
cause the norm is so strong.  But differences arise when asking wheth-
er to extend that protection to all accidental harms or only those 
caused by negligence.  Most debates over this choice resort to the im-
plicit logic of the social contract by insisting first that property rights 
are not “absolute” and then asking which rights against invasion all 
property owners surrender — shades of the Lockean theory — to pro-
mote social progress.  In some instances, lawmakers have used this ar-
gument to reject a system of strict liability and thus limit liability for 
accidental harms to instances of negligence.21  But although this ap-
proach adopts the proper methodology, it need not lead to a negligence 
rule for accidental harms.  What remains is the empirical issue of 
whether a person receives “more than a compensation” when surren-
dering the greater protection afforded under a strict liability system for 
the lesser protection afforded under negligence.  That conclusion is, to 
say the least, contestable.  Since rights and duties are strictly correla-
tive, why assume that the greater freedom of action is worth the loss in 
security?  The willingness to make extensive investments in real estate 
depends critically on protection from damages resulting from acci-
dental harm, such that the development of factories could benefit from 
the use of strict liability rules. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 21 See, e.g., Losee v. Buchanan, 51 N.Y. 476, 484–485 (1873) (“By becoming a member of civi-
lized society, I am compelled to give up many of my natural rights, but I receive more than a 
compensation from the surrender by every other man of the same rights, and the security, ad-
vantage and protection which the laws give me.  So, too, the general rules that I may have the 
exclusive and undisturbed use and possession of my real estate, and that I must so use my real 
estate as not to injure my neighbor, are much modified by the exigencies of the social state.  We 
must have factories, machinery, dams, canals and railroads.  They are demanded by the manifold 
wants of mankind, and lay at the basis of all our civilization.  If I have any of these upon my 
lands, and they are not a nuisance and are not so managed as to become such, I am not responsi-
ble for any damage they accidentally and unavoidably do my neighbor.  He receives his compen-
sation for such damage by the general good, in which he shares, and the right which he has to 
place the same things upon his lands.”). 
  For similar sentiments, see Brown v. Collins, 53 N.H. 442, 445–50 (1873).   
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In general, I come down in favor of the strict liability result,22 but 
for these purposes, it is key to avoid the tendency to over-
intellectualize the relationship between property law (that sets out the 
general relationships) and tort law (that deals with particular inva-
sions).  Balganesh never answers that question directly.  Nor, ironically, 
does he offer a clear answer to the question of why the rights of re-
dress are lodged in the owner, which is the standard conclusion of the-
ories of corrective justice.  But it is possible to give a sensible instru-
mental account of the moral intuition.  Surely the identity of the owner 
matters; otherwise, it is impossible to know who may sue for property 
damage or destruction.  The utilitarian foundation for the standard 
theories of corrective justice is that, as a first approximation, the own-
er is both in the best position to maintain the suit and most in need of 
recovery.  After all, who will be willing to invest in real estate devel-
opment if he receives no compensation for its destruction?  The analy-
sis, moreover, is exactly the same for copyright and patents, which 
again couple generalized duties of noninterference with specific rights 
of action vested in the owner whose rights are infringed.  To be sure, 
copyrights and patents do not have spatial locations, which is why, in 
any given jurisdiction, they have to be protected by being listed in a 
registry of some type accessible to all.  But so long as the right to ex-
clude is good against the rest of the world, does its protection cover 
only deliberate infringement, or also those made accidentally or by 
negligence? 
On this question, copyright and patent follow different paths, and 
for good reason.  The course of scientific progress is such that it would 
be virtually impossible to prove copying for new inventions that de-
pend largely on the same set of scientific laws and basic technologies.  
So the liability remains strict lest the protection prove worthless.  Cop-
yright presents a different set of issues, for the forms of words that are 
truly distinctive are not defined by the state of technology.  “Shall I 
compare thee to a summer’s day” is not likely to be written by just an-
yone, such that in general it is easy enough to establish that extensive 
passages have been lifted.  And Balganesh is surely right that this pre-
sumption is in fact reversed for common phrases of words or music in 
general circulation.23  The liability rule for copyright thus requires, as 
the name suggests, copying.  In both cases, however, the principle of 
strict correlativity is observed.  If liability depends on copying, the in-
dependent creation of a writing or a song is a protected liberty, not a 
legal wrong. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 22 See generally Richard A. Epstein, Nuisance Law: Corrective Justice and Its Utilitarian 
Constraints, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 49 (1979). 
 23 Balganesh, supra note 1, at 1683–84. 
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III.  DEFEASIBILITY 
Thus far I have stressed the two initial stages of any legal inquiry: 
the delineation of the basic rules of property good against the rest of 
the world and the articulation of the prima facie case for their inva-
sion.  But any prima facie case admits to defenses that can “defeat” li-
ability in a particular case.  It is this idea of defeasibility, on which 
Balganesh rightly relies, that links property law to tort.24  In dealing 
with this notion, however, it is critical not to repeat the mistake that 
H.L.A. Hart made when he claimed that defeasibility was the key to 
understanding the meaning of various key terms, such as contract.25  
Defeasibility is not definitional: a contract is an agreement between 
two or more people to abstain or perform specified actions.  Instead, 
defeasibility serves a different office by expressing the relationship be-
tween action and responsibility.  Thus, if A does not keep his promise, 
is he justified if B, who was to perform first, did not keep his?  Simi-
larly, the proposition that A entered B’s land states a prima face case 
of trespass, but that inference can be defeated in a number of ways.26  
Some are consensual, as by showing that A was a guest or customer of 
B.  Others are nonconsensual, as by showing that the entry was under 
conditions of necessity or pursuant to higher legal authority.  It is thus 
instructive that the English language has these pairs: entry/trespass, 
killing/murder, and nonperformance/breach.  The first term in each 
pair states the prima facie case of the latter.  But a complex array of 
defenses, which are themselves subject to further qualifications, pre-
vents any easy equation of the two. 
The exact details of these defenses are not easy to summarize in a 
few short sentences.  But the entire project is in line with the larger in-
strumentalist effort to maximize the appropriate (Paretian) standard of 
social welfare by a system of successive approximations to some ideal 
distribution of rights.  This strategy is very much in play in the law of 
copyright, which has its own extensive set of consensual and noncon-
sensual defenses, where the first is contained in the law of copyright 
licenses and the latter in the amalgam of “fair use” defenses to which 
Balganesh refers.27  The precise contours of these defenses are beyond 
the scope of this short article, but the basic pattern of their implemen-
tation is necessarily subject to the law of diminishing returns as it ap-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 24 Id. at 1684–86. 
 25 H.L.A. Hart, The Ascription of Responsibility and Rights, 49 PROCS. ARISTOTELIAN 
SOC’Y 171, 174–75 (1949).  Hart did not include this essay in his Essays in Jurisprudence and 
Philosophy because he came to see it as wrong.  See generally H.L.A. HART, ESSAYS IN JURIS-
PRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY (1984).  
 26 For a systematic implementation of this project, see Richard A. Epstein, Defenses and Sub-
sequent Pleas in a System of Strict Liability, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 165 (1974). 
 27 Balganesh, supra note 1, at 1684–86; see also 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2005). 
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plies to the design of legal systems.  The initial cut into the system, 
which creates the basic system of entitlements, promises large rates of 
return over the previous state of affairs and does so at relatively low 
cost.  The protection of individual autonomy and private property are 
key conditions for civic peace.  Each new refinement in the system, 
however, produces smaller benefits at increasing costs, as is surely the 
case with the complex set of public and private necessity doctrines that 
authorize a narrow class of nonconsensual entries into land.  The deci-
sion over whether to supply compensation for entries that cause dam-
ages offers still smaller gains but does so at increased cost.  Sooner or 
later, therefore, the costs of further refinement exceed the social gains, 
so that it becomes futile to capture each novel variation with its own 
special rule.  At this point, for want of a better alternative, legal sys-
tems often resort to basic conceptions of reasonableness, which operate 
as an invitation for triers of fact to continue the process of refinement 
on an ad hoc basis in individual cases.28  But that system works best 
as a backstop to the more specific process of introducing new argu-
ments step by step in a general pleading system. 
IV.  COPYRIGHT AND FREE SPEECH 
It is just this process of successive approximations that helps ex-
plain how intellectual property rights become incorporated into a more 
general legal system.29  To set the stage, note that our basic system of 
property rights starts with the protection of personal autonomy and 
property rights in tangible things.  If that law were treated as com-
plete, it would leave no space for either patent or copyright protection.  
A patent gives its owner the exclusive right, good against the world, to 
make or vend a particular thing.  That right necessarily limits the abil-
ity of all other individuals to fashion their tangible possessions into de-
vices of their own choosing even when their conduct neither poses a 
threat of the use of force against a third person nor counts as a breach 
of contract with any other person.  Similarly, the ordinary person has 
rights to freedom of speech so long as he does not engage in force 
(threats) or fraud (deceit and defamation).  Reading or reproducing the 
words of other individuals does not violate either of these fundamental 
prohibitions and thus counts as a protected version of free speech. 
It is clear, therefore, that any system of intellectual property is in 
marked tension with the apparently complete system of liberty and 
property generated under orthodox libertarian theories pertaining to 
force and fraud, which shape so much of the law.  One possibility is to 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 28 For further discussion, see EPSTEIN, supra note 20, at 31–42. 
 29 For a fuller account of this process, see Richard A. Epstein, Liberty Versus Property? Cracks 
in the Foundations of Copyright Law, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1 (2005). 
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conclude that both systems of intellectual property are illegitimate, but 
that option seems foolish in light of the enormous across-the-board 
gains that a sound system of copyright and patents can generate.  The 
basic social contract thus uses the same strategy that first generated 
rights in liberty and property to add yet one more key refinement into 
the overall system.  Recall that the rules of individual autonomy and 
first possession necessarily limit the rights of others to kill or maim or 
to wander freely over the land.  Due to the large number of individu-
als, there is no feasible path by which any one person can negotiate an 
elaborate set of private agreements that would move the world to a 
new equilibrium that protects liberty and property against all inva-
sions from any quarter.  So the social contract amounts to a gigantic 
forced exchange whereby everyone surrenders his or her right to in-
vade the person and property of others in exchange for similar security.  
The change works because the new constellation of rights yields higher 
values to all concerned than the older one — an empirical truth, to be 
sure, but a truth nonetheless. 
Instrumentalism is so crucial for understanding intellectual proper-
ty law because it offers the only explanation for how the acceptance of 
both patents and copyrights generates widely diffused social gains that 
justify the nontrivial costs of their implementation.  That conclusion 
necessarily depends first on the ability of copyrights and patents to 
create incentives for production and second on their ability to facilitate 
the commercialization of these writings and inventions once created.  
So understood, copyright and patent law function as important Pareto 
improvements over a system of liberty and (tangible) property that 
makes no allowance for their creation or enforcement. 
In general these basic rights work best when they follow the pat-
tern of other forms of property with respect to both protection against 
infringement and licensing for use.  But they do differ in one key re-
spect.  The gains from privatizing writings and inventions should be, 
and routinely are, subject to a time limitation that is not found in the 
law of real property.  Here is the functional explanation.  Suppose that 
the first possession rule gave the initial possessor title for only twenty 
years: what would happen at the expiration?  At that time, the proper-
ty either goes back into the common pool or it becomes subject to gov-
ernment ownership.  Either way, the prior owner of the property will 
have few incentives to make improvements that will outlast his owner-
ship of the property.  Yet nothing is gained by putting this title up for 
grabs a second time.  Hence, it is better to create an ownership system 
with infinite terms out of which shorter terms can be created by volun-
tary leasehold or other conveyance. 
Creating property rights in writings and inventions of unlimited 
duration has the advantage of longer time horizons for coherent prop-
erty development, but only at a far higher cost.  Given that patents 
and copyrights encode information, the original copyright or patent 
  
2012] UNIFYING COPYRIGHT 131 
 
holder can continue to use that information, just as others use it, after 
the copyright falls into the public domain upon the expiration of its 
term.  The great advantage of the open-access regime, which cannot 
be obtained with land, is that it increases the level of dissemination of 
the patented or copyrighted work in the later period by allowing many 
users access to the same basic writing or invention without charging 
fees.  Those fees otherwise would count as an additional cost, which 
would necessarily block usage by those who value the invention or 
writing less than the licensing fee.  Those losses are virtually impossi-
ble with land, which under most circumstances cannot be used simul-
taneously and productively by its owner and a legion of outsiders. 
At this point, the fundamental question is just how long these 
rights should extend.  Everyone agrees that a longer period is proper 
for copyright than for patents, a fact that constrains but does not de-
fine the proper term for either class of property rights.  Getting the 
right answer is soluble, at least in principle, through a search that 
seeks to maximize net social value from the creation of new inventions 
or writings.  For our purposes, however, the key point is not to identify 
these optimal terms, which should not reach the outrageous lengths 
found in the Copyright Term Extension Act,30 but to show that this 
inquiry is part of a continuous enterprise that allows for the orderly 
expansion of property law. 
CONCLUSION 
In this short comment, I have tried to defend what I regard as a 
traditional instrumentalist account of copyright law against 
Balganesh’s revisionist position.  The basis for that defense is easy to 
convey.  Generally speaking, it is best to rest on a simple and coherent 
intellectual base in order to develop the law of copyright and to show 
its linkage to the rest of property law.  Although I have given the gen-
eral outlines of this position, I have not developed its details.  But I 
think that I have said enough to warn people away from the ambitious 
and ingenious effort to couple the standard instrumental theories of 
copyright with an alternative deontological, if mystifying, account.  
The disagreement with Balganesh is not with regard to particular rules 
but with regard to overall approach.  I do not see any case in which 
his elaborate dualism clarifies the operation of copyright law, as his re-
sort to elusive notions of “legal normativity” poses the risk of leading 
copyright doctrine away from its most desirable path.  It is not that 
Balganesh’s flawed approach has generated results that are counterin-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 30 Pub. L. No. 105-298, §§ 102–104, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998) (amending 17 U.S.C. §§ 108, 
203(a)(2), 301(c), 302, 303, 304(c)(2)).  The constitutionality of the statute was upheld, alas, in El-
dred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 194 (2003). 
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tuitive.  It is just that the entire edifice can rest on firmer foundation if 
the law hews to a consistent instrumentalist interpretation.  Here, as in 
so many other areas, simple is best. 
